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6. Legal Ethics, Pain, and Suffering
N. Gregory Smith
G. Frank & Winston Purvis Professor of Law
LSU Law Center
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
I. Introduction
The lessons that come to us from the application of legal ethics rules
can be instruc:ive, but they often involve a considerable measure of pain
and suffering. If presentations like this have any value, perhaps that
value could be found in change. The hope would be that, after some
exposure to the stories and other matters included in the presentation, a
lawyer might thereafter do something that is more consistent with the
standards of the profession than he or she might otherwise have done.
II. News
A. Fired Partriers
The Sidley Austin Brown & Wood firm demoted or terminated a
number of partners during a 1999 restructuring effort. The firm had
created a mandatory retirement policy that created a sliding scale for the
forced retirement of partners between the ages of 60 and 65. Thirty-two
former partners brought age discrimination claims against the firm. In
October of lasi: year, the firm entered into a $27.5 million settlement with
the EEOC with respect to their claims. In entering into the settlement, the
firm acknowledged that the partners were "employees" of the firm for
ADEA purpo ses. The firm had earlier taken the position that the
claimants, as partners, could not be considered to be employees of the
firm. Michael Bologna, EEOC Reaches $27.5 Million Settlement In Age-
Bias Action Against Sidley Austin, 23 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on
Professional Conduct 533 (17 October 2007).
B. Malpractice Insurance Disclosure
In October of last year, the California State Bar's Board of
Governors declined to adopt a froposal that would have required that
state's lawyer, to disclose to clients and the state bar whether they carry
malpractice ir surance. The board split 8-8 on whether to adopt the
proposal, and the outgoing state bar president broke the tie by voting no.
In the meantime, Hawaii and North Dakota joined a growing list of
jurisdictions tf at require some form of malpractice insurance disclosure.
Twenty-three states have done this. Two - Arkansas and Kentucky - had
previously rejected mandatory disclosure.
Opponents of the California proposal had argued that its adoption
would have stigmatized uninsured lawyers, forcing them to buy
expensive cove.rage, and causing an increase in the level of fees those
lawyers charge to their low-income clients. Lance J. Rogers, Two States
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Pass Insurance Status Rules; California Bar Eschews Required
Disclosure, 23 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct
531 (17 October 2007).
C. Attorney-Client Privilege
According to a recent survey, a large number of in-house counsel
believe that the attorney-client privilege is "either non-existent or
severely damaged" in the context of government investigations.' This
view has arisen in connection with a Department of Justice policy on
investigations, stated in the so-called "Thompson Memorandum," which
allows government lawyers to show leniency toward corporations that
cooperate with an investigation. One measure of cooperation is whether
the corporation agrees to waive the attorney-client privilege and the
protection of the work product doctrine. This investigatory approach
pressures corporations to give up privilege claims. One worry is that if
corporate officers have less assurance that evidentiary privileges will be
available to protect sensitive communications, those officers might be
reluctant to talk to corporate lawyers. They will not get the advice that
they need. In-House Attorneys Believe Privilege Is 'Severely Damaged,'
Survey Finds, 23 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual On Professional Conduct
391 (25 July 2007).
D. Risky Practice Areas
Panelists at an October 2006 Large Law Firm Symposium
considered some dangers associated with three of the higher-risk practice
areas: Intellectual property, entity formation, and bankruptcy.
Intellectual property work demands more than a conventional
conflicts check, according to the panel. In addition to parties, subject
areas must also be checked. That is because it is possible to have more
than one client pursuing the same technology path.
On the entity formation front, the panel observed that lawyers for
closely-held entities can get themselves into unwaivable conflicts. Part of
the problem is identifying the client. Is the lawyer representing all of the
partners or all of the incorporators? Only the general partners? Only one
of the incorporators? Once the entity is actually formed, will the lawyer
be representing the entity, and only the entity?
In bankruptcy practice, there are some jurisdictions in which only an
actual conflict warrants disqualification or forfeiture of the fee. But in
other jurisdictions, a potential conflict is enough. A lawyer who
represents a debtor with a lot of creditors may find that some of the
creditors are clients of his or her law firm. If so, there are potential
conflicts. 22 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 505
1 More than 90% of 458 respondents expressed skepticism about the viability of the
attorney-client privilege.
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(18 October 21)06).
E. Discipline and Small Firms
It seem,; that solo practitioners and small firm lawyers are
disciplined more frequently than large firm lawyers. A January 9, 2007
panel discussion, held in conjunction with the ABA Midyear Meeting,
explored reasons why that might be so.
According to two panelists, disproportionate discipline of solos and
small firm lawyers does not reflect animus against them by bar counsel.
One of them suggested that the nature of their practices, such as criminal
defense and matrimonial dispute representation, tends to generate
disgruntled clients who complain to disciplinary authorities.
Another panelist said that solo and small firm practitioners do not
have the institutional oversight that lawyers in large firms have. Such
oversight curbs inadvertent and deliberate rle violations. Larger firms
also have resources to avoid grievances, including the ability to refund
fees to prevent a grievance from being filed.
One panelist, however, asked whether bar counsel might have an
institutional bias that favors large firm practitioners. The same panelist
wondered if the high concentration of cases initiated by grievances from
clients of solo practitioners and small firm lawyers might mean that bar
counsel rely too much on such grievances, and unethical behavior by
large firm lawyers might go undiscovered.
Another panelist suggested that there may also be an institutional
reluctance to pursue cases against large firm lawyers because such
lawyers have the resources to mount better defenses and create more
costly prosecutions than do solo practitioner and small firm lawyers.
One panclist observed that some lawyers who receive discipline are
"frequent fliers" - recidivists whose frequent encounters with
disciplinary authorities often result in repeated discipline. This panelist
indicated that such lawyers tended to be solo and small firm lawyers and
asked whether there is something in the nature of those practice
arrangements that enhances the risk of repeat offenses. Martin Whittaker,
Speakers Explore Reasons Why Discipline Most Often Hits Solos, Small-
Firm Lawyers, 23 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct
98 (21 February 2007).
F. Conflicts Check
An article in the ABA Journal states:
Deep down, every practicing attorney knows that the most crucial
step in taking on a new client isn't the initial contact, or the wining
and dining, or even signing the representation agreement.
It's the conflicts check.
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But all too often, lawyers treat the conflicts check as almost an
afterthought, even though doing so can have disastrous
consequences, including loss of clients, ethics sanctions and
malpractice claims.
Martha Neil, Check, Please, ABA Journal, May 2006, at 50.
One lawyer who was interviewed for the article, Lawrence J. Fox,
stated, about conflicts checks:
One, don't rely on your memory. And two, don't rely on your
database, because your memory is faulty and your database can't
possibly be complete. Id. at 52.
The article notes that
[o]ther recommended steps include a daily e-mail alerting all
lawyers at the firm about new matters coming in.... Moreover a firm
should rely on an in-house specialist, rather than the attorney
bringing in a new matter, to determine whether a conflict exists and
how it should be handled. Id.
The article mentions some real-life examples of conflicts that caused
problems for lawyers and law firms, and it refers to some reasons why
conflicts problems arise.
G. Unqualified Assistant DA
Ilya Movshovich started working in the San Francisco District
Attorney's office as a volunteer, then became a paid law clerk, and then,
after the February 2007 California bar exam results were released, he
sought promotion to Assistant District Attorney.
But it turned out that Movshovich was not on the list of those who
had passed the February bar exam. Indeed, after some further checking,
the District Attorney's office learned that he had lied about being a law
student. At one point he had produced a document showing that he was a
student at the University of San Francisco Law School. But the document
was an apparent forgery. The office checked with San Francisco Law
School and the University of San Francisco School of Law, but
Movshovich had not attended either one.
Movshovich was fired. He said that he regretted the
"misunderstandings" that had led to his dismissal, and that he hoped that
the situation would not negatively impact his law career. See Prumising
D.A.'s Office Law Clerk Fired for Lying, San Francisco Chronicle, June
1, 2007, at B-3, and reproduced at http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/06/01/BAGIPQ5QUUl.DTL
III. Louisiana Cases
A. Permanent Disbarment Cases
The number of lawyers who have been permanently disbarred
continues to grow.
- 192 -
4
Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 55 [2008], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol55/iss1/10
1. Short Subjects
In re Stephens
955 So. 2d 140 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Evidence indicated that attorney had committed three separate
armed bank robberies, and would have committed a fourth had a police
vehicle not fortuitously driven into the bank's parking lot. Permanently
disbarred.
In re Favors
938 So. 2d 677 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Attorney ":ailed to provide competent representation to his clients,
neglected his clients' legal matters, failed to communicate with his
clients; failed to refund approximately $2,600 in unearned fees,
converted approximately $41,000 of client and third-party funds to his
own use, engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation, abandoned his law practice when he relocated to
Georgia without notice to his clients, and failed to cooperate with the
ODC in numerous investigations." 938 So. 2d at 677. The sole mitigating
factor - the absence of a prior disciplinary record - was insufficient to
outweigh "the applicable aggravating factors," and the court ordered
permanent disbarment.
In re Frank
942 So. 2d 1050 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Attorney, who had been previously disbarred, began to engage in
serious misconduct soon after being readmitted to practice. The
misconduct included failure to act with reasonable diligence, dishonesty,
.commingling, misappropriation of client funds, and knowingly filing
false documents. He was permanently disbarred.
In re Shortess
950 So. 2d 570 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Attorney found to have committed several acts of professional
misconduct, including conversion of funds belonging to at least fourteen
clients as well as an unknown number of third parties. Permanent
disbarment.
In re Spradling
952 So. 2d 642 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Attorney found to have engaged in various acts of misconduct,
including conversion of client funds and submission of false evidence in
the disciplinary proceeding concerning his misconduct. Permanently
disbarred.
In re Sheffield
958 So. 2d 661 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Permanent disbarment for a lawyer who engaged in Medicaid fraud
193 -
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and illegally used a physician's registration number to obtained a
controlled dangerous substance, both of which are felonies.
In re Domm
965 So. 2d 380 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Permanent disbarment ordered for a previously disbarred attorney
who neglected a client's matter, failed to communicate with the client,
failed to return the client's file, failed to cooperated with the ODC during
its investigation of the client's complaint, and, while representing
another client, "knowingly and intentionally engaged in conduct
involving moral depravity with a minor child."
In re Hughes
956 So. 2d 575 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Judge who was removed from office for pervasive judicial
misconduct was also permanently disbarred.
In re Williams
958 So. 2d 655 (La. 2007)
Lawyer who had been declared ineligible to practice law for failure
to pay bar dues and the disciplinary assessment nonetheless continued to
practice law, handling at least 17 cases during the period of ineligibility.
The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted his petition for voluntary
permanent resignation from the practice of law.
In re Williams
967 So. 2d 1141 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Williams, an attorney who had, already been disbarred for
disobeying court orders, tampering with an accident report, failing to
cooperate with the ODC, and practicing law while ineligible to do so,
was charged with additional instances of misconduct that arose before
and after his disbarment. These included:
his failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing clients, his failure to communicate with his clients, his
failure to comply with his obligations upon the termination of the
representation, and his failure to return unearned fees. Even more
egregious are respondent's actions involving the unauthorized
practice of law, accepting compensation for representing a client
without the client's consent, engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, and failing to cooperate with the investigation of
disciplinary matters.
967 So. 2d at 1147. Concluding that Williams would pose "a threat of
danger to the public in the event he is permitted to resume practicing
law," the court ordered permanent disbarment.
- 194 -
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2. Other Permanent Disbarment Cases
In re Smith
942 So. 2d 34 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Attorney permanently disbarred for neglecting legal matters, failing
to communicate with his clients, converting client and third-party funds,
failing to account for or refund unearned fees paid by his clients, failing
to return a client's file, and failing to cooperate with the ODC in its
investigation.
One intere!;ting feature of the case was that the attorney had already
been disbarred, in 1999, and that the misconduct at issue in this case took
place before the disbarment. On this point, the Louisiana Supreme Court
noted: -"Nevertheless, the ODC did not seek to consolidate the two
proceedings. Moreover, for reasons which have not been adequately
explained in thi record, the ODC did not institute formal charges in this
matter until February 2004." 942 So. 2d at 40, n. 2.
Justice Johnson dissented, and stated: "Had the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel brought all the charges at the time of respondent's
initial disbarme-nt proceeding in 1999, he could not have been
permanently disbarred, since the court had not yet adopted that sanction.
Only by holding the charge over until 2004, was respondent exposed to
the more severe sanction." Id. at 41.
In re Norris
939 So. 2d 1221 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Norris withdraw large sums of money from the accounts of his
former law finn and converted the funds. The law firm obtained a
judgment awarding it more than $800,000 based on the conversion.
Thereafter, the law firm commenced involuntary bankruptcy proceedings
against Norris. On four occasions, Norris testified under oath that he had
burned $500,000 he had withdrawn from his bank safety deposit box.
Specifically, he testified that the day after he learned of the state court
judgment again 3t him, he went to the bank and removed the currency
from the safety deposit box, placed it in his briefcase, and took it home,
where he doused the $100 bills with gasoline and burned them in a metal
trash barrel in his back yard. Norris was convicted of four counts of
perjury based on these false statements.
In the disciplinary case, the Louisiana Supreme Court said:
Respondent committed perjury on four separate occasions in an
effort to avoid satisfying a civil judgment owed to his former law
partners. His conduct reflects nothing less than a willful attempt to
subvert the judicial process to his own ends. We cannot and will not
condone conduct by an attorney that is so plainly calculated to
frustrate the administration of justice. 939 So. 2d at 1226-27.
He was also permanently disbarred.
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In re Aguillard
958 So. 2d 671 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Following Hurricane Katrina, Attorney Aguillard made Internet
contact with a person whom he believed to be a 13-year old evacuee
from New Orleans, and arranged to meet her in a park for the purpose of
engaging in sexual relations. However, the "girl" was an investigator
from the Attorney General's office, who had been conducting an
undercover operation. When Aguillard appeared at the park, he was
arrested and charged with computer-aided solicitation of a minor. Later
investigation of evidence on his computer's hard drive revealed that
Aguillard had previously engaged in sexual intercourse with a 15-year
old girl. He was charged with criminal activity for this as well.
In the disciplinary case, the Louisiana Supreme Court said that "any
sanction less than permanent disbarment would require us to ignore the
seriousness of respondent's conduct and the grave harm he has done to
his juvenile victim and to the public's confidence in the legal
profession." 958 So. 2d at 674.
In re Spears
964 So. 2d 293 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Spears pleaded guilty to a felony count of computer fraud and
conspiracy to commit computer fraud, in violation of federal law. The
fraud arose out of a scheme in which Spears, an attorney with the
Orleans Indigent Defender Program, and Kirkland, a probation officer,
offered participants in a drug court probation program a release from
probation obligations in exchange for cash payoffs. To carry out their
payoff scheme, Spears and Kirkland caused false information to be
entered into the drug court's computer system. Spears was caught when
an undercover law enforcement officer, posing as a probationer, paid her
$2500 to obtain a release from probation.
The ODC charged Spears with criminal conduct that reflected
adversely on her honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer; conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice, all in violation of Rule 8.4.
Spears was permanently disbarred.
In re Burks
964 So. 2d 298 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Burks was employed as an assistant city attorney for the City of
New Orleans for about twelve years. In his last year, he was assigned as
a prosecutor in traffic court. In 2004, Burks met with an undercover FBI
agent who was posing as a taxi driver and who pretended to want to
resolve several outstanding traffic citations. Burks accepted $1000 in
cash from the agent in exchange for his agreement to drop the charges.
The dismissal of the charges was entered in the computer database of the
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Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles, where individual driving records are
maintained. Based on this conduct, Burks was charged with and pleaded
guilty to one county of felony computer fraud.
Burks was later charged with a violation of Rule 8.4(b), for
commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. When the case came
before the Louisiana Supreme Court, it said: "We cannot and will not
condone conduct by an attorney that is so plainly calculated to frustrate
the administration of justice." 964 So. 2d at 303. Burks was permanently
-disbarred.
In re Dickson
968 So. 2d 136 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
The ODC filed three sets of formal charges against Dickson,
involving five separate counts of misconduct. Some of the charges arose
out of the handling of money. For example, in one case, Dickson
deposited a settlement check into his operating account, because he did
not maintain a client trust account. In another, he withdrew nearly
$40,000 from hi:; client's bank account, using a power of attorney,
without accounting for the funds.
Other charges arose out of Dickson's representations that he could
improperly influence officials on his client's behalf. He told a client that
if he paid him $1 8,000, he would "pay off" the judge and the district
attorney in order to obtain a more lenient sentence in a criminal matter. It
appeared that the client reasonably believed that Dickson had the
connections to atrange such a deal. When the client was ultimately
unable to pay the full $18,000, Dickson urged him to plead guilty, and
assured him that he could work out a five-year sentence. When the client
pled guilty, he was sentenced to ten years.
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that Dickson had:
knowingly and intentionally violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct by Failing to maintain a client trust account, failing to
timely pay third-party medical providers, neglecting legal matters,
converting client funds, and improperly claiming that he could
influence the 'udiciary. 968 So. 2d at 141.
Considering the misconduct as a whole, the court stated that the
appropriate "baseline sanction" was disbarment.
However, the court went on to consider the guidelines applicable to
permanent disbarment, and noted that Guideline 2 "applies to conduct
involving the intentional corruption of the judicial process." Id. at 142. It
then stated:
Respondent ;ought a payment of money from his client,
intentionally representing to his client that he had the ability to
influence the judiciary. Although there is no evidence respondent
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actually attempted to improperly influence the judiciary, his actions
clearly resulted in a corruption of the overall judicial process for his
personal gain. This court will not .countenance any actions by an
attorney which suggest that the attbrney can improperly influence
the judiciary. Id.
Dickson was permanently disbarred.
B. Other Disciplinary Cases
1. Bar Admission
Applicants to the bar are required to demonstrate that they have
good moral character. They are sometimes denied admission for failure
to meet that burden. Sometimes those grounds arise on account of failure
to disclose relevant information in connection with the bar application.
They can also arise in connection with the administration of the bar
exam.
In re Esukpa
947 So. 2d 714 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Esukpa passed the essay portion of the Louisiana Bar examination,
but the Committee on Bar Admissions declined to certify him for
admission on character and fitness grounds. The Louisiana Supreme
Court agreed, and stated:
The record of this matter reveals that petitioner has applied for
admission in Louisiana on fourteen occasions since his graduation
from law school in 1990, and on each application he failed to
disclose his prior arrests as well as a civil matter in which he was
named a defendant. Petitioner admitted that these omissions were
knowingly and intentionally made because he feared he would not
be admitted in the face of an accurate disclosure.
Under the circumstances, there can be no doubt that petitioner has
demonstrated a lack of candor which reflects adversely on his
character and fitness. We therefore conclude that petitioner has
failed to meet his burden of proving he has "good moral character"
to be admitted to the Bar of this state. 947 So. 2d at 715.
See also In re Brown, 951 So. 2d 165 (La. 2007) (per curiam) (Bar
applicant, who successfully completed the essay portion of the bar
examination, was denied admission on character and fitness grounds. He
had a record of five arrests for driving while intoxicated. The Louisiana
Supreme Court concluded that Brown had failed to meet his burden of
proving that he has good moral character to be admitted to the bar).
In re Rojas
929 So. 2d 1229 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Rojas was an applicant for the July 2004 Louisiana bar exam who
had been accused of cheating on the February 2004 bar exam. Following
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an investigation, a commissioner appointed by the Louisiana Supreme
Court determined that Rojas had spoken to the applicant sitting next to
her during the February Civil Code III examination, in violation of a rule
that there be no alking during the exam, and that "the purpose of their
talking was to in some way cheat on the exam, since there are no other
reasonable hypotheses for the talking." 929 So. 2d at 1230. The
commissioner recommended that Rojas not be permitted to ever practice
law in Louisiana. Rojas objected to the recommendation, and the matter
came before the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The court accepted the commissioner's recommendation, stating:
After hearing oral argument, reviewing the evidence, and
considering the law, we find it is established by the record that
petitioner spoke to the applicant seated next to her during the Civil
Code III examination administered in February 2004. We further
find that such conduct constituted cheating by petitioner.
Cheating on the bar examination is a particularly egregious act of
dishonesty which we cannot excuse or overlook. Accordingly, it is
ordered that the application by petitioner seeking permission to sit
for the Loui:;iana Bar Examination be and hereby is permanently
denied. Id.
See also In re Lamqont, 929 So. 2d 1228 (La. 2006) (per curiam) (the bar
applicant that spoke to Rojas received the same sanction.
2. Malpractice and Discipline
There is sornething of a twilight area between the kind of lawyer
misconduct that can result in formal discipline and that which is more
appropriately handled through malpractice litigation.
In re Brown
967 So. 2d 482 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
In representing some clients in connection with an automobile
accident, attorney Brown filed suit against Allstate Insurance Company
and its insured. The defendants were not served, however, until over five
years had elapsed from the initial filing of the suit. After they were
informed that the insurance company considered the case to have been
abandoned, the clients filed a complaint with the ODC
The ODC charged Brown with, among other things, failing to
provide competent representation to a client, in violation of Rule 1.1,
failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
chent, in violation of Rule 1.3, failing to communicate with a client, in
violation of Rule 1.4, and failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation, in violation of Rule 3.2.
The Louisiana Supreme Court did not agree that Brown had violated
all of these rules, but it concluded that Brown had failed to competently
handle the personal injury matter, had neglected it, and had failed to
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expedite the litigation consistent with the interests of his clients.
It then turned to the matter of what to do about the violations:
The question of when ordinary legal malpractice becomes an ethical
violation is somewhat unclear. Strictly speaking, virtually any time
an attorney allows his client's case to prescribe or to become
abandoned, it could be said the attorney lacks competence in
violation of Rule 1.1 and failed to act with diligence in violation of
Rule 1.3. However, as a practical matter, disciplinary sanctions are
not always appropriate in every instance in which an attorney
commits minor violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct ....
When significant discipline has been imposed in this context, the
cases typically involve situations in which the malpractice is
combined with additional misconduct, such as where the attorney
acts with deceit or misrepresents facts in an effort to conceal the
malpractice from the client .... 967 So. 2d at 486.
In this instance, the court.observed that Brown's actions "were not
the product of an evil or dishonest motive," and it also found that they
did not cause any actual harm. Id. Under the circumstances, the court
said that "the matter would be more appropriately considered in a civil
malpractice action rather than a disciplinary proceeding." Id. However,
since the ODC had proved disciplinary violations by clear and
convincing evidence, the court ordered a public reprimand. Two justices
dissented on the ground that Brown should have been suspended from
the practice of law.
3. Fees and Related Problems
Many of the circumstances that result in lawyer discipline arise out
of disputes concerning attorney fees. Rule 1.5 sets forth the basic
standards, including the standard that the lawyer is not to charge or
collect an unreasonable fee. But other rules sometimes have a role in the
resolution of fee disputes.
Culpepper & Carroll, PLLC v. Cole
929 So. 2d 1224 (La. 2006) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 495 (2006)
In this case, a law firm brought an action against a former client to
collect a 1/3rd contingent fee based on a settlement offer that the law
firm had obtained on the client's behalf but that the client had refused to
accept. The case arose out of the client's effort to contest his mother's
will. The contingent fee agreement specified that the law firm would
receive 1/3rd "of whatever additional property or money we can get for
you." This meant property or money beyond that provided in the will that
was the subject of the dispute.
As a result of settlement negotiations, the mother's estate offered
additional property worth approximately $21,600. The law firm
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recommended that the plaintiff accept the offer, but he refused to do so.
Thereafter, the law firm refused to file suit, and the client terminated the
representation. The former client pursued the matter on his own, but
recovered nothing. The law firm eventually sued the former client,
seeking approximately $7,000, and some other amounts, based on the
rejec.ted settlement offer. The law firm prevailed in city court, and at the
court of appeal.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. Initially, it observed that
the client had received "no additional property or money as a result of
the litigation against his mother's estate. Because Mr. Cole obtained no
recovery, it follows that Mr. Culpepper is not entitled to any contingent
fee." 929 So. 2d at 1227.
But this did. not end the analysis:
Nonetheles;, Mr. Culpepper urges us to find that his contingency
should attach to the settlement offer he obtained on behalf of his
client, even though his client refused to accept that offer. According
to Mr. Culpepper, he did the work for which Mr. Cole retained him,
and he is therefore entitled to one-third of the amount offered in
settlement, notwithstanding Mr. Cole's rejection of the settlement
offer.
With the benefit of hindsight, it would have been in Mr. Cole's best
interest to accept the settlement offer obtained by Mr. Culpepper.
However, ii: is clear that the decision to accept a settlement belongs
to the client alone. See Rule 1.2(a) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to
settle a matter."). Therefore, regardless of the wisdom of Mr. Cole's
decision, h.s refusal to accept the settlement was binding on Mr.
Culpepper.
To allow Mr. Culpepper to recover a contingent fee under these
circumstances would penalize Mr. Cole for exercising his right to
reject the settlement. We find no statutory or jurisprudential support
for such a proposition. Indeed, this court has rejected any
interpretation of the Rules of Professional Conduct which would
place restrictions on the client's fundamental right to control the
case. Id.
So the law firm was ultimately unsuccessful.
In re Simpson
959 So. 2d 836 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
In this case, an attorney was disciplined for charging an excessive
fee and for pursuing vexatious litigation against a client. Simpson had
agreed to represe.nt some relatives of Betty Kitchen Bankston, who had
died leaving an estate consising of some $200,000 in cash and some real
estate that was valued in excess of $1 million. These relatives suspected
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that Mrs. Bankston's signature on a will that identified one of her
nephews as the sole residual legatee was a forgery. After Simpson had
received a report from a forensic document examiner that concluded that
the signature on the will "exhibited differences not observed in the other
documents sent to him for comparison," he agreed to represent twenty of
Bankston's heirs on a one-third contingency fee agreement.
Simpson filed a petition to set aside the will. Five days later, the
attorney who had filed a petition to probate the will agreed to withdraw it
from probate and told Simpson that the estate would be distributed in
accordance with the law of intestate succession, as Simpson's clients had
sought. Thereafter, fourteen more heirs signed Simpson's contingency
fee contract. He did not inform them that the will contest had already
been successful and that they were entitled to their portion of the estate
without paying any fees.
Subsequently, Simpson received a check for $123,145, representing
the portion of the cash assets of the succession owed to his 34 clients.
Simpson wrote a check to himself for one third of the amount, and
distributed the balance to his clients, without providing them with an
accounting.
He later filed an "Amended Judgment of Possession" to recognize
his fee interest in Bankston's real property. One of Bankston's nieces,
Ms. Perry, filed a challenge regarding the amount of Simpson's fee. She
also filed a disciplinary complaint. While the fee dispute was pending,
Simpson filed a petition against Ms. Perry, alleging that statements made
in her pleadings constituted defamation per se and false light invasion of
privacy. Eventually, the court of appeal dismissed Simpson's suit.
However, the litigation resulted in legal fees for Perry in excess of
$63,000.
The ODC charged Simpson with violations of several of the Rules
of Professional Conduct. A hearing committee concluded that Simpson
had "tricked the clients into signing contingency contracts when no
contingency existed." 959 So. 2d at 842. And it said that Ms. Perry's
lawsuit contesting his fee "did not call for the response visited upon her
by [Simpson]." It also noted that the allegations of Ms. Perry's petition
were not libelous, and commented that "there is absolutely no way a
reasonable mind could believe" otherwise. 959 So. 2d at 840.
In the end, Simpson agreed to forego charging a fee to the second
group of fourteen clients that had come to him after the will contest case
had been resolved. Nonetheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded
that Simpson had charged an excessive fee. It said:
[The record reveals that respondent, has entered into one-third
contingency fee contracts with his 34 clients. Respondent collected
$41,044.12 in fees in September 2000 when he distributed the cash
funds of the succession to his clients. Moreover, while respondent
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has agreed to forego any contingency fee from the second group of
fourteen cl:.ents, he contends that he is still owed approximately
$130,000 uider his contingency fee contract with the first group of
twenty clients. Considering respondent's admission that he worked
only twenty to thirty hours on the succession matter before it was
resolved, we find these attorney's fees are clearly excessive. Id. at
845 (footnote omitted).
And it said the following about the litigation with Ms. Perry:
Turning to the issue of the harassing litigation, we agree with the
hearing co:mnittee and the disciplinary board that respondent's
conduct in the litigation against his client, Jeannette Perry, was
nothing short of abusive. Respondent opposed Ms. Perry's lawsuit
which she filed in an effort to foreclose his assertion of an improper
ownership interest in her aunt's succession, and he filed a merciless
defamation suit against her. Respondent even opposed his client
when it carne to light that she was not served with the suit prior to
the entry of the default judgment against her. As a result of this
vexatious litigation, Ms. Perry incurred substantial legal fees and
suffered needless worry and distress. Respondent's actions caused
actual and substantial harm to Ms. Perry, as well as to the legal
system. Id. at 845.
In the end, the court ordered a three-year suspension, all but one
year and day deferred.
4. Client File
A number of disciplinary cases make mention of the lawyer's failure
to return the client's file upon termination of representation. Rule 1.16(d)
requires the lawyer, upon termination of representation, to take steps to
protect the clients interests. It also requires the lawyer to promptly
release the entire file upon written request by the client.
In re Hyman
958 So. 2d 646 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Hyman was charged with failing to return the files of three clients
upon termination of representation. In one. of the cases, involving a
work-related accident, Hyman was discharged several years after filing a
personal injury lawsuit and after instituting a workers' compensation
claim. In terminating Hyman, the client requested his file. Hyman did not
comply with the request. On four subsequent occasions, the new lawyer
for the client wrote to Hyman, requesting the client's file. But Hyman did
not provide it. Later, motions were filed to compel production of the file
in both the cour: action and the worker's compensation proceeding. The
judge in the worker's compensation matter ordered Hyman to produce
the file, but he did not do so. Still later, another attorney for the client
wrote to Hyman asking for the file, and, when that failed, filed a motion
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to compel production. Hyman did not appear at the motion hearing. The
judge ordered production, but Hyman did not produce the file within the
period ordered by the court. Ultimately, however, after a complaint had
been filed with the ODC, Hyman managed to produce the client's file.
Commenting on Hyman's behavior, the Louisiana Supreme Court
said that "the potential for harm was significant." 958 So. 2d at 649-50.
Hyman was suspended for nine months, all but ninety days deferred,
with two years of supervised probation to follow.
5. Existence of Attorney-Client Relationship
In general, if there is no attorney-client relationship, there can be no
valid claim for lawyer malpractice. But it is not always obvious whether
or not that relationship exists.
Williams v. Roberts
931 So. 2d 1217 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2006)
In this case, two members of a limited liability company (LLC)
brought a legal malpractice action against an attorney who had been
retained by another member of the LLC to assist in the LLC's formation.
In particular, they claimed that Roberts, the attorney, had been in a
fiduciary relationship with them and that he had failed to consult with
them regarding the contents of an operating agreement and other aspects
of the LLC's formation that they alleged to be adverse to them, but
favorable to another member of the LLC who had been given sole
control of the entity.
The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendants, on the
ground that there had been no express agreement for Roberts to represent
the plaintiffs. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that summary judgment
was inappropriate because the evidence established that the plaintiffs
reasonably believed Roberts to be their attorney.
The court of appeal said, with respect to the central malpractice
issue in the case:
To establish a claim for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove: 1)
the existence of an attorney-client relationship; 2) negligent
representation by the attorney; and 3) loss caused by that
negligence." . . . In this case, the issue is whether there was an
attorney-client relationship between Roberts and the Williams
Brothers. 931 So. 2d at 1219-20.
According to the court of appeal, the evidence relevant to the
attorney-client relationship included the following:
In his affidavit introduced in support of his motion for summary
judgment, Roberts stated that he was retained by Litton on October
16, 2002 to create the L.L.C. and that he drafted the articles of
organization, the initial report, and the operating agreement and
transmitted them to Litton via e-mail. Roberts was aware that Litton
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was meeting with the Williams Brothers and Dockens, the other
member of the L.L.C., in order to execute the documents that he had
prepared. On October 25, 2002, Litton requested some additions to
the operating agreement, which Roberts made and transmitted to
Litton by e-rnail. Roberts further stated that at no time did he or his
firm receive a request from the Williams Brothers to represent them
in connection with the creation of the L.L.C. Roberts further stated
that he understood, based on information furnished to him by Litton,
that the Williams Brothers had their own attorney. Roberts further
stated in his affidavit that the first contact he had with the Williams
Brothers was when they came to Roberts' office to sign franchise
documents, which neither he nor anyone from his firm prepared.
Roberts also stated in his affidavit that he represented the L.L.C. in
connection vith collection efforts against the Williams Brothers
with respect to their capital contributions to the L.L.C.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the Williams
Brothers each submitted identical affidavits. In these affidavits, the
Williams Brothers stated that at no time did anyone tell them that
Roberts did not represent them or that they should seek independent
legal counsel. The Williams Brothers stated that they believed that
Litton had requested for Roberts to represent all of them in the
formation of the L.L.C. and that they reasonably believed that
Roberts reprcsented them. Id. at 1220.
The court of appeal noted its agreement with the trial court that "it is
not unusual for one party's attorney to prepare a document for several
parties to sign and that the Louisiana Bar would be stunned to learn that
in doing so, an attorney became the attorney for all parties." Id.
In this instance, the:
Williams Brcthers presented no evidence, other than their affidavits
attesting to their belief that Roberts represented them, tending to
show the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Moreover, we
note that even though whether an attorney-client relationship exists
turns largely on one's subjective belief that it does, a person's
subjective be:.ief that an attorney represents him must be reasonable
under the circumstances. Exposition Partner, L.L.C. v. King,
LeBlanc & Bland, L.L.C., 03-580 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/10/04), 869
So.2d 934. Id at 1220-21.
Accordingly, the court of appeal affirmed the order of summary
judgment against the plaintiffs.
6. Communications
Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct requires, among other
things, that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the
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status of the matter. This rule is cited with some frequency in formal
charges by the ODC.
In re Lawrence
954 So. 2d 113 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Attorney Lawrence was subject to disciplinary proceedings based
on his neglect of some client matters and his failure to communicate with
several clients. . He had previously been disciplined for failing to
communicate with clients and failing to safeguard client property. The
Louisiana Supreme Court evaluated the conduct as follows:
The genesis of most of respondent's misconduct in the instant case,
as well as his earlier misconduct in Lawrence I, is his repeated and
willful refusal to keep his clients reasonably informed about the
status of their legal matters. As we explained in Louisiana State Bar
Assen v. St. Remain, 560 So. 2d 820, 824 (La.1990), "[proper
communication with clients is* essential to maintain public
confidence in the profession."
We are particularly disturbed by the testimony of several clients in
this matter who testified that they were forced to call respondent
from different telephone numbers in order to get him to answer their
calls. There is simply no excuse for such conduct by a member of
the bar of this state. 954 So. 2d at 120.
Lawrence was suspended for 18 months.
7. Paying a Witness
Rule 3.4 prohibits lawyers from offering inducements to witnesses
that are prohibited by law.
In re Bruno
956 So. 2d 577 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
In 1989, Bruno was appointed to be one of eight members of the
Plaintiffs' Legal Committee (PLC) in a federal class action lawsuit
arising out of an explosion at the Shell Oil Company refinery in Norco.
Bruno was introduced to Jack Zewe, a longtime Shell employee, by a
mutual friend. Zewe told Bruno that Shell's attorneys were destroying
relevant documents and "teaching witnesses to lie," and he indicated that
he would be willing to cooperate with the PLC against Shell, for money.
Bruno paid Zewe $5,000, with the agreement that Mr. Zewe would keep
track of his time and expenses and that, at the end of the litigation, he
would apply to the court for payment as an expert witness.
Shell learned that one of its employees was providing information to
the PLC, and it filed a motion to disqualify the members of the PLC.
During a hearing, one of the lawyers who was arguing on behalf of the
PLC affirmatively stated that the PLC had made no payments to Zewe.
Bruno was present, but he said nothing about this misrepresentation. Nor
did he reveal the true facts when another attorney filed a brief with the
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court asserting that the PLC had not paid Zewe. However, some 2 V2
months after the 1earing on the motion to disqualify, Bruno disclosed to
the district court judge that he had paid Zewe and that he had promised
Zewe that the PLC would seek additional monies for him at the
conclusion of the litigation.
After the eKplosion litigation was settled, the district court
appointed the United States Attorney's Office to investigate and report
on Bruno's condv.ct. Eventually, a federal judge concluded that Bruno
had been guilty of paying a witness and failing to be candid with the
tribunal. The federal district court ultimately suspended Bruno from
practicing law in the federal courts of the Eastern District of Louisiana
for a period of one year.
Formal charges were also filed by the ODC, claiming that Bruno
had "paid a fact witness for inside information" in violation of Rule
3.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (which prohibits a lawyer
from offering an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law) and
that he had failed to promptly correct the false statements of his co-
counsel in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) (which prohibits a lawyer from
knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal).
Bruno admitted his misconduct in his answer to the formal charges, and
the issue became one of the proper sanction.
The Louisiana Supreme Court said, of the misconduct:
"Respondent's payment to a witness and lack of candor towards a federal
judge violated the integrity of the judicial system and undermined the
proper administration of justice, causing a potentially adverse effect on
the legal proceedirg." 956 So. 2d at 582. The court also indicated that the
baseline sanction for such misconduct is suspension. It did find
mitigating circumstances, including Bruno's good reputation in the legal
community, the fact that he had "suffered the imposition of other
penalties and sanc:ions for his conduct," and his expression of "genuine
remorse." Id.
The end resul: was a three-year suspension from the practice of law,
eighteen months of which were deferred in light of the "significant
mitigating factors." Id. Justice Victory, in dissent, said that a more severe
sanction was warranted.
8. Moonlighting
Lawyers who are employed by law firms can run into serious
trouble when they simultaneously try to practice law on the side, without
the firm's knowledge.
In re Dowell
938 So. 2d 994 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
In the summer of 2001, Stacy Stratton hired attorney Dowell, an
employee of the Windhorst firm, to handle her father's succession.
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Although Dowell told Stratton that he would be working on the
succession as a Windhorst matter, he asked her to make the retainer
payment checks out to himself. In fact, Dowell handled the succession as
a private practice matter without Windhorst's knowledge or consent and
despite Windhorst's policy of not allowing full-time attorneys to have a
private practice. However, Dowell did log time on his Windhorst time
sheets with respect to the succession.
Not long after taking on the succession matter, Dowell left the
Windhorst firm. He told Stratton that he would continue to work on the
succession, but he failed to diligently pursue the matter and thereafter
failed to communicate with Stratton. When he did communicate with her,
he informed Stratton that he had filed the succession when, in fact, he
had not done so.
Some time later, Windhorst sent Stratton a bill in the amount of
$1,965 for work done by Dowell despite the fact that Stratton had
already paid for this work with a $2,000 retainer she had provided to
Dowell.
Dowell terminated his attorney-client relationship with Stratton in
October of 2002. He returned some of Stratton's file materials. But he
failed to return a tax refund check, payable to the decedent, that Stratton
had given to Dowell. He also failed to account for the $2,000 retainer
and the tax refund check.
Disciplinary proceedings were commenced after a Windhorst
partner had filed a complaint with the ODC. The Louisiana Supreme
Court described the misconduct as follows:
The record supports the conclusion that respondent neglected the
succession he was hired to handle for Ms. Stratton, failed to
communicate with his client, misappropriated the fees due to
Windhorst, misappropriated the tax refund check belonging to the
decedent's estate, failed to provide Ms. Stratton with a complete
copy of her file upon termination of the representation, engaged in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,
and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. This
conduct falls far below the high ethical standard expected of
attorneys licensed to practice law in this state. 938 So. 2d at 998.
Regarding the sanction, the court stated: "Considering the facts of
the case as a whole, with particular emphasis on respondent's dishonesty
both toward his client and his law firm, we conclude disbarment is the
appropriate sanction." Id. at 999.,
In re Bernstein
966 So. 2d 537 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Bernstein was employed by the Lowe Stein firm. On several
occasions, when clients paid him directly for the legal services he
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provided, he cashed the checks and did not turn the money over to the
firm. To cover up his conduct, he told the firm's accounting department
to "write off" the client's bill. The conduct came to light when he cashed
a client's check, neglected to tell the accounting department to write off
the bill, and went on vacation. The accounting department issued a
supplemental bill to the client, who supplied the firm with proof that the
bill had already been paid. Bernstein's partners confronted him about his
behavior when he returned from vacation. Although he initially blamed
his secretary for making a "mistake," he later admitted his misconduct,
and the firm fired him. However, the firm did not report Bernstein to the
ODC.
Bernstein .ater worked for the Sessions Fishman firm. The firm
became aware of the circumstances under which Bernstein had left Lowe
Stein, but hired him after he promised that "it would never happen
again." Unfortunately, it did.
Eventually Bernstein began sending clients billing statements on
his personal letterhead stationery. When he received a check from the
client, he would cash it and keep the money for himself. Because these
billing statements did not go through the firm's accounting department,
and because he did not enter time worked for these clients in the firm's
timekeeping system, the firm did not know about what he was doing.
The scheme came to light when a client, who had questions about a
bill, asked thc accounting department for more detailed billing
information. The firm fired Bernstein and told him that if he did not
report the matter to the ODC, the firm would.
Bernstein's lawyer wrote to the ODC and told it that Bernstein
suffered from a "condition of mental impairment" that involved
"impulsive and uncontrollable urges to cash relatively small checks for
payment of his ]legal services which should have been deposited into his
former law firms' accounts." 966 So. 2d at 540.
Bernstein was charged with conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4. He did not deny the
misconduct, but sought mitigation based on a diagnosed "impulse control
disorder" and a "major depressive disorder." In a mitigation hearing, a
psychiatrist:
testified that in his opinion, respondent's "diversion" of funds that
should have gone to his law firms is not a purely criminal act, but
was driven by an impulse to gain relief from the physiological
discomfort he was then experiencing. Id. at 541.
When the case reached the Louisiana Supreme Court, it observed
that the baseline sanction for misappropriation of funds was disbarment.
The issue was whether there should be a downward deviation from that
sanction due to the evidence that Bernstein suffered from a mental
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condition. The court was not persuaded. It said:
Based on our review of the record in its totality, we find Dr.
Scrignar's conclusion that respondent's actions were beyond his
control is at odds with many of the objective facts in this case. For
example, although Dr. Scrignar testified respondent was not
motivated by greed, the testimony of respondent's law partners
uniformly established that it appeared respondent was living beyond
his means and that his lifestyle was not consistent with the income
he earned. Additionally, the record reveals respondent's methods of
misappropriating funds evolved over time in order to allow him to
avoid detection, suggesting his actions were not purely impulsive....
Finally, respondent himself admitted that he knew his actions were
wrong when he testified, "[y]ou mull it over in your head so much
that you rationalize any the moral implications of something you
know is wrong."
Considering all these facts, we are- unable to find that respondent's
mental condition was the sole cause or even a principal or
substantial cause of his misconduct. While respondent may have
used his "lack of fulfillment" as a moral justification for his
misappropriation, the record does not support the conclusion that
there is any significant causal nexus between any mental disability
and the misconduct. Accordingly, pursuant to ABA Standard
9.32(1), we give little weight to respondent's alleged mental
disability.
Reduced to their essentials, respondent's actions demonstrate a
fundamental lack of honesty which falls far below the standards
expected of attorneys admitted to the bar of this state. We are
particularly disturbed by the fact that after being dismissed from
Lowe Stein, respondent sought employment at Sessions Fishman
without disclosing the reason for his discharge. After the facts came
to light, respondent represented to his law partners that "it would
never happen again." Of course, this representation turned out to be
a lie.
Candor and honesty are a lawyer's stock in trade.... The record of
this case demonstrates to us that respondent has not acted with
candor or honesty during his career as a lawyer. Considering the
fifteen-year history of deceit and dishonesty evidenced by this
record, we would be remiss in our duty to protect the public if we
accepted respondent's self-serving assertion that "it won't happen
again." Id. at 544-45 (footnote omitted). Bernstein was disbarred.
9. Money
Lawyers are charged, under Rule 1.15, with safeguarding their
clients' property, including their money. This is the same rule that
requires lawyers to operate client trust accounts. A separate rule,
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Rulel.8(a), imposes significant limitations on lawyers' ability to enter
into business transactions with clients.
In re Jones
952 So. 2d 673 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Lawyer Jones was alleged to have engaged in various acts of
misconduct. Summarizing the evidence in the case the Louisiana
Supreme Court said:
[The evidence produced by the ODC establishes in a clear and
convincing matter that respondent failed to communicate with his
clients, failcd to deposit advance fees into his client trust account,
failed to provide accountings, failed to refund unearned fees, failed
to place disputed funds in his client trust account, failed to return a
client's file upon termination of the representation, converted client
funds to his own use, and solicited a representation. These facts
establish violations of Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, and 7.3 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. 952 So. 2d at 680.
The court had some more specific things to say the handling of funds:
In the Len3ey matter, respondent knowingly and intentionally
converted more than $9,000 of Ms. Lensey's funds by placing these
funds into his operating account. Even accepting respondent's
contention :hat there was some confusion as to whether the
representation was on an hourly basis or contingent basis, the record
establishes :hat respondent knew Ms. Lensey disputed the fee.
Therefore, respondent had a clear duty to place the disputed funds in
his trust account pursuant to Rule 1.5. His failure to do so amounts
to a convernion of client funds. When respondent's conversion is
combined with his other fraudulent acts, such as falsely endorsing
Ms. Lensey's name to the check, the baseline sanction is
disbarment. Id. at 680-81 (footnote omitted)
Regarding the solicitation, the evidence showed that Jones
approached the parents of a shooting victim at a funeral home, while they
were making arrangements for their son's funeral, and asked to meet
with them about the killing. The parents did not know Jones, and they
had had no prior 'rofessional relationship with him. Jones later filed suit
on their behalf. Bat their claims were subsequently dismissed, apparently
on the ground that the son had a daughter, which affected the viability of
the parents' wrongful death claim. The Louisiana Supreme Court
characterized the solicitation as a "very serious professional infraction."
Id. at 681. Jones was disbarred.
In re Cofield
937 So. 2d 330 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Keith Davis, a minor, received a substantial monetary award for
injuries sustained in a car accident. His mother, Ms. Jones, handled his
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affairs until he became 18. Thereafter, he began to handle his own
money. When he began to engage in what his mother regarded as
excessive spending, she hired attorney Cofield to prepare a full power of
attorney to give her control over the affairs of her "disabled and
spendthrift" son. Keith signed the document. She requested that Cofield
set up a trust for her son and designate her as trustee. Cofield prepared
the trust documentation, but designated himself as trustee.
In September 1999, Cofield prepared a line of credit promissory
note for $50,000, listing himself as borrower and Keith as lender. In
October, Cofield issued a $14,000 check from the trust account payable
to cash, which Cofield himself then cashed. He treated half of the
$14,000 as a personal loan, to himself.. He held the other half as a fund
out of which to make advancements to Keith.
Ms. Jones sued Cofield on behalf of her son and herself. Just prior
to the filing of the lawsuit, Cofield prepared and Keith executed a
revocation of the power of attorney in favor of Ms. Jones. After the
lawsuit had been filed, Cofield prepared and had Keith execute a
statement terminating the services of the lawyer who had sued Cofield
and directing that the lawsuit be dismissed. He also prepared and had
Keith execute a motion to dismiss the suit, even though Keith was
represented in the lawsuit by the attorney who was suing Cofield. The
court denied the motion to dismiss the litigation. On April 24, 2000,
Cofield was removed as trustee. Disciplinary proceedings followed.
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that Cofield had engaged
in misconduct, which it described as follows:
Our review indicates the record supports a finding of misconduct in
the Davis Trust matter. Respondent acted as the attorney for both
Ms. Jones and Mr. Davis. He drew up an irrevocable trust document
and named himself as trustee over Mr. Davis' funds even though he
did not have the requisite training or knowledge for such a position.
Thereafter, he failed to properly communicate with Ms. Jones. He
also requested and obtained a loan from Mr. Davis, who, based on
his testimony at both hearings, appears to have some amount of
mental disability or deficiency. He also kept Mr. Davis' cash in his
office safe in order to prevent Ms. Jones from learning of her son's
spending habits. When Ms. Jones could get no reasonable
explanation from respondent regarding the $14,000 withdrawal, she
retained the services of another attorney to sue him on behalf of
herself and her son. Despite the lawsuit, respondent continued to
have repeated contact with Mr. Davis and took advantage of his
deficient mental capacity in an attempt to have the lawsuit
dismissed and his liability released. 937 So. 2d at 341-42.
Cofield's conduct violated several of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
including Rules 1.1(a) (competency), 1.4 (communication), 1.7 (conflicts
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of interest), 1.8 (business transaction with client), 1.14 (client with
diminished capacity), 1.15(a) (safekeeping property), 2.1 (independent
professional judgment), 4.2 (communication with person represented by
counsel), and 8.4 (misconduct).
He also engaged in misconduct with respect to three other client
matters. lie was disbarred.
In re Austin
943 So. 2d 341 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Before lie attended law school, attorney Austin worked as a
stockbroker. After being admitted, he set up a law office. He also
continued to act as a stockbroker.
Attorney Babineaux began practicing law out of Austin's office. It
appeared that Babineaux was largely responsible for organizing and
operating Austin's personal injury business. Babineaux also had his own
clients. He ag::eed to pay Austin one-half of all attorney's fees he derived
from his own clients. Babineaux did not have a client trust account of his
own, but used Austin's for all cases he brought to the firm during the
period of his association with Austin.
In 1997, Babineaux began representing Ms. Hutto in connection
with an inheritance matter. In February and March of that year,
Babineaux received sums totaling $338,535.36 on Ms. Hutto's behalf, all
of which he deposited into Austin's trust account. Ms. Hutto expressed a
desire to earn a greater return on her funds than the minimal interest paid
on bank deposits. She also requested Mr. Babineaux's assistance in
preserving and protecting the funds for her five adult children. Because
of Austin's bickground as a stockbroker, Babineaux approached him
about Ms. Hutto's needs. Austin suggested to Babineaux that, under
certain conditions, he would be able to guarantee a return of 10% to Ms.
Hutto, while still providing for her monthly needs and those of her
children. Late::, Austin met with Babineaux and Ms. Hutto. Austin and
Ms. Hutto agreed that Austin would retain a portion of Ms. Hutto's funds
and would pay Ms. Hutto $2,000 per month, along with payments of
$500 per month to each of her children, with interest at a rate of 10%.
This agreement was not reduced to writing.
In 1998, Babineaux left Austin's office to work as a district
attorney. Thereafter, Ms. Hutto hired another lawyer, Oubre, to represent
her. Acting for Ms. Hutto, Oubre terminated Austin's services,
demanded an accounting, and sued him. She also filed a complaint with
the ODC, claiming that Austin had represented her as an attorney and
had failed to safeguard her money.
The principal issue in the disciplinary case was whether there had
been an attorney-client relationship between Austin and Ms. Hutto. The
Disciplinary Board concluded that there had been such a relationship. It
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also concluded that Austin had violated Rule 1.15 when he withdrew Ms.
Hutto's funds from his trust account without notifying her or providing
her with any sort of documentation, promissory note, or receipt for the
funds. Moreover, it concluded that he had exploited the representation by
entering into a business transaction with a client without offering the
appropriate safeguards, and had failed to exercise independent
professional judgment on her behalf.
The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed, and concluded that an
attorney-client relationship had not been established. Although in some
cases it had stated that "the existence of the attomey-client relationship
turns largely on the client's subjective belief that it exists," the court
referred to the Restatement for a different standard in this case:
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:
(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer
provide legal services for the person; and eithef
(a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or
(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person
reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services. . . . Id.
at 347 (citing Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14
(2000)).
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the court said:
[W]e find the undisputed facts establish that Ms. Hutto did not
manifest an intent that respondent provide legal services for her. To
the contrary, Ms. Hutto's testimony, taken in connection with the
earlier civil proceedings, reveals that Ms. Hutto twice denied under
oath that respondent was her attorney or that he "ever handle[d] any
legal cases" for her. Rather, Ms. Hutto steadfastly indicated her
attorney was Mr. Babineaux.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Ms. Hutto could have
believed respondent was her attorney, there is nothing in the record
to indicate respondent consented to perform legal services for her or
that he had a reasonable basis to believe that she was relying on him
for such services. The testimony of respondent and Mr. Babineaux,
both of whom were found to be credible witnesses by the hearing
committee, establishes that respondent contracted with Ms. Hutto to
perform investment services for her. Obviously, performing
investment services does not constitute the practice of law, as these
services are typically offered by non-attomeys such as stockbrokers
or investment consultants.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize there can be a potential
for confusion when an attorney wears a multitude of hats. To protect
the client, this court has given great deference to the client's
-214-
26
Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 55 [2008], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol55/iss1/10
subjective belief whether an attorney-client relationship exists....
Nonetheless, the overarching question is whether there is a
reasonab e, objective basis to determine that an attorney-client
relationship has formed.... In the instant case, the client's subjective
belief and the objective facts unite to form one inescapable
conclusion: no attorney-client relationship ever existed between
respondent and Ms. Hutto. 943 So. 2d at 347-48 (footnotes
omitted).
Because no attorney-client relationship existed, the court concluded
that the ODC had not proved that Austin had violated, among other
things, Rules 1.8(a) (on business transactions with clients), 1.15 (on
safekeeping property), and 2.1 (on exercising independent professional
judgment).
The court also considered whether Austin's conduct violated Rule
8.4, but it did not find that Austin's dealings with Ms. Hutto were
fraudulent or deceitful.
However, the court did express a cautionary observation:
As a person trained in the law, respondent should have realized that
entering into an unwritten investment arrangement with an
unsophisticated person involving a substantial sum of money was a
transaction fraught with danger. Although we do not find
respondent acted dishonestly under the evidence presented, the
potential for mischief under such a nebulous agreement is obvious.
We take this opportunity to caution respondent, as well all other
members of the bar, to be especially vigilant in dealing with the
public to avoid the possibility of harm, even when acting outside of
the role as attorney. Id. at 349.
10. Client Gifts
Gifts from clients are terrific, but they can also entail risks. The
relevant rule, Rule 1.8(c), was at issue in the following case.
2 The court included, in a footnote, the following language from the Sheinkopfcase:
Human beings routinely wear a multitude of hats. The fact that a person is a lawyer,
or a physician, or a plumber, or a lion-tamer, does not mean that every relationship
he undertakes is, or can reasonably be perceived as being, in his professional
capacity. Liwyers/ physicians/ plumbers/ lion-tamers sometimes act as husbands,
or wives, or fathers, or daughters, or sports fans, or investors, or businessmen. The
list is nearly infinite. To imply an attorney-client relationship, therefore, the law
requires mcre than an individual's subjective, unspoken belief that the person with
whom he ii; dealing, who happens to be a lawyer, has become his lawyer. If any
such belief is to form a foundation for the implication of a relationship of trust and
confidence, it must be objectively reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances. We agree with the court below that this threshold was not crossed in
the instant case. [emphasis in original]
943 So. 2d at 348, n. 7.
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In re Succession of Walters
943 So. 2d 1165 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2006)
This case involved a dispute over a will in which the testator named
her attorney, Groves, who was also her second cousin, as executor and
residuary legatee. She also made testamentary legacies to Groves and his
children. One of the other legatees challenged the gifts to Groves and his
children, claiming, among other things, that the gifts were null and void
because Groves or an attorney in his firm had prepared the will.
Rule 1.8(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer
from preparing an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the
lawyer any substantial gift from a client. And, under the imputed
disqualification rule, if another lawyer in the firm would be prohibited
from drafting the document, all of the other lawyers in the firm would be
prohibited as well.3 However, Rule 1.8(c) includes an exception to the
prohibition for relatives. The pre-2004 version of the rule, applicable in
this case, was not specific about the closeness of the relationship. It
merely included an exception "where the client is related to the donee."
The current version of the rule is somewhat more specific. It states, in
pertinent part: "For purposes of this paragraph, related persons include a
spouse, child, grandchild, parent, or grandparent."
The court concluded that the exception applied, and that the gifts to
Groves and his children did not violate the rule. It stated:
Since there was no definition contained in the statute at the time the
will was drafted, the logical interpretation to be applied to Rule
1.8(c) is that the exception includes those "related" by blood or
marriage. Mr. Groves's relationship to Ms. Walters as a second
cousin qualifies under this definition. 943 So. 2d at 1168.
The complaining legatee also claimed that the gift violated Rule 1.7
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which is the basic conflict of
interest provision of the rules. The argument was that neither Groves nor
a lawyer in his firm should have prepared the will because the
representation was materially limited by Groves' own interests. In
particular, it was argued that a provision of the will requesting that
Groves, as residuary legatee, "consider distributing certain unnamed
assets" created a conflict of interest because those distributions would
come out of his legacy." Id. at 1168.
The court rejected this claim as well. Although it said that it would
have been preferable for Groves to have obtained outside counsel for the
preparation of the will (which he apparently tried to persuade the testator
to permit), the court did not find that the provision created "such a
Rule 1.10 states the general rule of imputed disqualification. The most recent
version of the Rules of Professional Conduct also include an imputed disqualification
provision in Rule 1.8 itself.
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conflict of intere st as to materially limit him in his representation of [the
testator]." Id.
11. Unreal Settlement
Fraud is n t to be encouraged. And lawyers who try to settle
malpractice cases with their clients should recall that there are some rules
about that in Rule 1.8(h).
In re Heisler
941 So. 2d 20 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Heisler rep:resented Butler on a contingent fee basis in a personal
injuiy case. The defendant offered to settle for $8000. Heisler rejected
the offer withoit telling Butler about it. After filing suit and after
undertaking son.e preliminary discovery, Heisler took no further action
on the case.
In 2002, Butler inquired about the status of the case. At this point,
no action had been taken on it for over three years. Heisler told her about
the settlement offer, told her that he thought it was inadequate, but he
also directed her to accept the offer. Realizing that it would not be likely
that he could rvive the case, Heisler decided to fund the settlement
himself, without telling his client the truth. He prepared a simulated
settlement sheet for Butler's signature, reflecting a gross settlement of
$8,000 and deductions for medical expenses, court costs, client advances,
and a 40% attorney's fee. Dissatisfied with the "settlement," Butler later
filed a complaini with the ODC.
Heisler admitted, in the disciplinary proceedings, that he had.
attempted to reniedy his malpractice through an improper settlement. In
light of some mitigating circumstances, which included remorse,
cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings, and lack of any prior
disciplinary infractions during fifty-five years of practice, the court
ordered a one--year suspension, fully-deferred, with unsupervised
probation.
12. Malpractice Disclosure
Lawyers arc fiduciaries for their clients. Does this mean that they
should disclose acts of 'Malpractice to their clients?
In re Williams
947 So. 2d 710 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
Attorney Williams was charged with several instances of
misconduct, and was disbarred. One of the instances of misconduct
included failing to disclose to a client that Williams had committed
malpractice.
The Louisiana Supreme Court summarized the instances of
misconduct as follows:
-217-
29
Smith: Legal Ethics, Pain, and Suffering
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2008
The undisputed evidence in the record of this matter reveals that
respondent neglected six legal matters, failed to communicate with
seven clients, failed to protect one client's interest upon termination
of the representation, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in four
investigations. Respondent also allowed one client's claim to
prescribe and did not inform her that she may have a malpractice
claim against him for his failure to file suit on time. This conduct
violates Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.8, 1.16(d), and 8.1(c) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. 947 So. 2d at 713-714.
The court did not explicitly state which rule was violated by the failure to
tell the client about the potential malpractice claim. But such a failure
could be seen to run afoul of Rule 1.4, on communication, and involve a
conflict of interest. The obligation to make the disclosure would also be
consistent with the concept that a lawyer is a fiduciary for the client.
13. Fiduciary Duty to Other Lawyers
Although lawyers are fiduciaries to their clients, it is harder to claim
that they are fiduciaries for lawyers whom they do not represent.
Scheffler v. Adams and Reese, LLP
950 So. 2d 641 (La. 2007)
In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the extent to
which two lawyers representing the same client might have fiduciary
obligations to each other.
Attorney Scheffler was retained by Boomtown Casino Westbank to
defend personal injury claims. Boomtown instructed Scheffler to work
with and report to attorney Perdigao, of the Adams and Reese firm.
Approximately two years later, Boomtown informed Scheffler that
Perdigao had "ethical problems" and that another Adams and Reese
lawyer would be taking his place. According to a relatively
contemporaneous newspaper article, Perdigao had billed and collected
fees outside of the law firm's accounting system. Scheffler apparently
had no knowledge of or involvement with these activities. Nonetheless,
he received a letter from Boomtown terminating his representation "in
light of recent events."
Scheffler sued, alleging that he had claims against Perdigao for
negligent interference with a contractual relationship, intentional
interference with a contractual relationship, negligence, unfair trade
practices, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. He also claimed that the
Adams and Reese firm was responsible for Perdigao's actions under
principles of respondeat superior and that the firm was independently
liable for its negligence in failing to adequately supervise Perdigao's
activities.
Following a hearing, the district court dismissed all claims, except
the one for breach of fiduciary duty. That. issue came before the
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Louisiana Supreme Court.
With respect to general propositions, the court observed:
Generally, whether a fiduciary duty exists, and the extent of that
duty, depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the
relationship of the parties. As a basic proposition, for a fiduciary
duty to exist, there must be a fiduciary relationship between the
parties....
The defining characteristic of a fiduciary relationship ... is the
special relat onship of confidence or trust imposed by one in another
who undertakes to act primarily for the benefit of the principal in a
particular endeavor. 950 So. 2d at 647-48.
In this instance, the court concluded that there had been no fiduciary
relationship between the two lawyers:
A review of Scheffler's petition reveals that there are no facts
pleaded that would establish a legal relationship between the parties
that would give rise to fiduciary obligations. In other words, the
petition faih to allege facts sufficient to establish the existence of a
fiduciary relationship between Scheffler and Perdigao or Adams and
Reese. The petition clearly avers that Scheffler and Perdigao were
retained ind:vidually and independently by Boomtown to represent
Boomtown. There is no allegation of a contract between Scheffler
and Perdigao or Adams and Reese. Likewise, the petition is devoid
of any allegations regarding the existence of a mandate, or agency
relationship, between the attorneys, i.e., there is no allegation that
Perdigao or Adams and Reese was transacting any of Scheffler's
affairs for the benefit of Scheffler; only that the parties were
separately retained by Boomtown to represent Boomtown. Neither
is there any allegation of a co-ownership interest in the endeavor,
such as would derive from a partnership or joint venture agreement
between the attorneys.
The petition alleges only that Scheffler was instructed by his client
"to work wi-h and answer to Perdigao." Even when construed most
favorably to Scheffler, the petition, at best, describes a relationship
in which the attorneys acted as co-agents of Boomtown. Id. at 648
(footnote omitted).
But the court did not stop here. It also rejected the fiduciary duty
claims based on public policy. Scheffler had argued that Perdigao and
Adams and Reese had had an obligation to protect his prospective
interest in attorney fees. The court said:
[W]e conclude that it is fundamental to the attorney-client
relationship that an attorney have an undivided loyalty to his or her
client. This duty should not be diluted by a fiduciary duty owed to
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some other person, such as co-counsel, to protect that person's
interest in a prospective fee. While, as a practical matter, both the
client and co-counsel stand to benefit from any recovery, their
interests are not always identical. It would be inconsistent with an
attorney's duty to exercise independent professional judgment on
behalf of his client to impose upon him a fiduciary obligation to
take into account the interests of co-counsel in recovering any
prospective fee.
Accordingly we hold that, as a matter of public policy, based on our
authority to regulate the practice of law pursuant to the constitution,
no cause of action will exist between co-counsel based on the theory
that co-counsel have a fiduciary duty to protect one another's
prospective interests in a fee. To allow such an action would be to
subject an attorney to potential conflicts of interest in trying to serve
two masters and potentially compromise the attorney's paramount
duty to serve the best interests of the client. Id. at 653.4
IV. Materials fror Other Jurisdictions
A. Abusive Disciplinary Investigation
Although reported cases of this kind are rare, disciplinary counsel
can sometimes engage in inappropriate conduct.
Breiner v. Sunderland
143 P.3d 1262 (Haw. 2006) (per curiam)
Attorney Breiner was the subject of two disciplinary complaints.
Both involved claims related to fees in criminal defense representation.
Sunderland, an assistant disciplinary counsel, met with Breiner about the
allegations in one of the matters. Two years later, Sunderland asked
Breiner to respond to 26 questions about the case. Thereafter, on separate
occasions, he asked Breiner to provide a complete copy of the original
file, identify accounts in which he had deposited money received from
the client, and produce twelve categories of financial records. Thereafter,
4 The court noted that an earlier case might be read to articulate a different rule. But
it stated:
There is only one reported decision in Louisiana that suggests that a breach of the
fiduciary duty owed by attorneys engaged in a joint venture might in some
circumstances support a cause of action for intentional interference with contract.
Krebs v. Mull, 97-2643 (La. App. I Cir. 12/28/98), 727 So.2d 564, writ denied, 99-
0262 (La.3/19/99), 740 So.2d 119. To the extent that Krebs deviates from the
bright-line rule announced herein that no cause of action will exist between co-
counsel based on the theory that co-counsel have a fiduciary duty to protect one
another's prospective interests in a fee, it is disapproved.
Id. at 653 n. 10.
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[b]y letter dated November 5, 2004, Sunderland sought detailed
answers to seventeen additional questions ....
On March 22, 2005, Sunderland asked Breiner to respond to twenty-
four additional questions. Breiner responded on May 19, 2005, and,
thereafter, Sunderland sought additional information by telephone
on June 23, 2005. Breiner responded on August 26, 2005.
On October 10, 2005, Sunderland sought responses to twenty-nine
additional questions. Breiner responded to each question by letter
dated January 19, 2006.
On January 26, 2006, Sunderland sent to Breiner one hundred
additional qaestions, many with multiple sub-questions, and, on
February 3, 2006, Sunderland forwarded two more questions. 143
P.3d at 1265.
On March 20, 2006, Breiner's attorney wrote to the chief
disciplinary counsel, complainiing of Sunderland's "oppressive and
overreaching behaviors." The chief disciplinary counsel responded by
saying that the "requests for information seem appropriate, focused, and
necessary to conclude complex investigations into serious allegations of
misconduct by clients[.]" Id.
On April 12, 2006, Breiner petitioned for a writ of prohibition. The
matter eventually came to the Hawaii Supreme Court, which ordered
relief. The court stated:
We fully recognize that an attorney has a duty to cooperate with a
disciplinary investigation. . . . Sunderland's questions to Breiner,
however, rec uire much more than cooperation regarding grievances
submitted by Breiner's clients. In fact, Sunderland's questions
require Breirier to make admissions, to analyze and apply rules, and
to state legal conclusions.... Sunderland's letter-questions are
interrogatories of the worst sort inasmuch as they are onerous and,
in a number of instances, improper. Many questions ask Breiner to
opine on maaters that the ODC appears to be trying to establish and
for which it bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence...
Some "questions" are offensively imperious ....
Other questions exhibit a complete misunderstanding of the rules at
best or const: tAute harassment at worst ....
Sunderland's questions and comments, in our view, clearly exceed
any rule of reasonableness that can be applied to the broad
discretion granted for disciplinary investigation. Id. at 1269.
The court ordered Sunderland to be removed from the case. It also a
established time deadline for the ODC to complete a review and make a
recommendation and, if formal proceedings were to be commenced, an
additional time deadline for those proceedings. If the deadlines were not
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met, the court ordered that the charges be dismissed. It also ordered the
disciplinary board to propose rules concerning
(1) the scope of disciplinary investigations, including, but not
limited to, subject matters that may permissibly be investigated or
discovered in relation to a complaint or grievance and (2) the means
by which an attorney who is the subject of a disciplinary
investigation or proceeding may seek protective orders from the
Disciplinary Board and this court..Id. at 1270.
B. Problems with Fees
1. Sex
Disciplinary Counsel v. Sturgeon
855 N.E.2d 1221 (Ohio 2006) (per curiam)
Ohio lawyer Sturgeon pressured financially vulnerable female
clients for sexual favors in exchange for reduced legal fees. Over the
course of a year, he fondled one client and made crude comments to her,
he persuaded another client to perform oral sex on him, and he exposed
himself to another client after making crude comments to her.
The Ohio Supreme Court discussed Sturgeon's conduct as follows:
[His] actions were rude, offensive, and thoroughly unprofessional.
He used the attorney-client relationship to gratify his own sexual
interests rather than focusing on the legal needs of his clients. His
crude behavior would not be acceptable in any social setting, and it
was outrageously inappropriate in the midst of an attorney-client
relationship. Respondent preyed on women who were in vulnerable
legal and financial circumstances, and he tried to seduce them for
his own selfish gratification.
. . . [L]awyers must always exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice to their clients. A lawyer who
attempts to engage in a sexual relationship with a client -
particularly when the client is clearly not interested in that kind of
relationship - puts the lawyer's own personal feelings ahead of the
objectivity that must be the hallmark of any successful attorney-
client relationship. By repeatedly initiating sexual conduct with
clients, respondent called into serious doubt his commitment to a
profession in which the clients' interests must always come first.
855 N.E.2d at 1225.
For his actions with the clients, and for lying in disciplinary
proceedings, Sturgeon was permanently disbarred.
2. Lawyer Education
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Manger
913 A.2d 1 (Md. 2006)
Client Alba Miller approached attorney Manger, a 75-year old
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attorney, for ass;istance with child custody problems. She had been
denied joint custody of her two children due to a diagnosis that she
suffered from bipolar disorder with paranoid tendencies. Miller agreed to
pay Manger on a hourly basis.
There were problems with the legal fees. According to the Maryland
Court of Appeals,
A significant portion of Respondent's activity, for which he billed
his client, was aimed at educating himself on mental health issues . .
. . However, Respondent's education at his client's expense went
too far. It should have been apparent to the Respondent that he
would not be a witness in the case and that educating himself was
not a substirute for presentation of expert testimony on the mental
health issues;.
The bulk of' Respondent's research was of a general nature and
should not have been billed to the client. A client who engages
counsel has a right to expect that the attorney will have sufficient
general knowledge to competently represent her. While it may be
appropriate to charge a client for case-specific research or
familiarization with a unique issue involved in a case, general
education or background research should not be charged to the
client.
Similarly, the significant amount of time that Respondent devoted to
preparing a memorandum to accompany the Petition to Set Aside or
Modify the Custody Order, as well as the submission of witness
declarations in support of the Complainant, were essentially
pointless. While it might have been useful to interview potential
witnesses and even obtain their statements for his file, Respondent
should have realized that these declarations consisted of
inadmissible hearsay. The trial court could not have considered the
declarations to prove the substance of the witness statements.
The Court also finds that the Complainant was excessively billed for
administrative activities and other items that should have been
absorbed as Dffice overhead, such as looking up zip codes, making
up Rolodex cards and the like. Complainant should not have been
charged for such items at all, and certainly not at an attorney's
hourly rate. 913 A. 2d at 5.
There were Edditional problems with the quality of Manger's work.
Although he did a lot of work, in preparing his petition on the custody
issue, Manger did not consult the Maryland Rules, statutes or case law
concerning child custody. Instead of attempting to show that there had
been "a material change in circumstances" related to child custody,
Manger "focused his significant efforts on a quixotic attempt to establish
that the court was wrong when it entered the custody order in the first
place." Id. at 5-6. Manger was indefinitely suspended.
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3. Inflation
In re Nussberger
719 N.W.2d 501 (Wis. 2006) (per curiam)
L.R., who was the personal representative for the estate of her
mother, retained attorney Nussberger to handle the probate of her
mother's estate. With the exception of some money that was to be paid to
L.R.'s brother, the estate's assets were required to be turned over to the
State of Wisconsin to repay governmental assistance that the mother had
received during her lifetime. Nussberger told L.R. that it was unfortunate
that she would not be receiving any funds from the estate, other than the
2 percent allowed to her as the personal representative's fee. L.R. asked
about billing the estate for work that her husband had done to care for her
mother's house while it was waiting to be sold. Nussberger responded
that she could not receive any additional payment beyond the personal
representative's fee. But he suggested to. L.R. that he could submit a
billing statement for his legal work that was higher than the amount of
the fees he had actually earned and then split the extra money with L.R.
L.R. was troubled by the suggestion and contacted the police. They
arranged for L.R. to wear an electronic recording device at her next
meeting with Nussberger. In that meeting, after some initial discussion,
Nussberger raised the possibility of "trying to get a little bit extra."
He explained that, hypothetically, if the actual fee might be $1500,
he could submit a bill for $2500, which he didn't think would raise
any flags with the people reviewing the invoice. After further
discussion, Attorney Nussberger said that he would have to review
the matter further. He then stated that he would have to look at what
his office's regular time was and how much he could potentially
pad. 719 N.W.2d at 504.
The idea was never implemented, but the client filed a disciplinary
complaint based on the recommendation to inflate the bill. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the conclusion of a referee that
Nussberger's conduct constituted counseling a client to engage in
conduct that he knew was criminal or fraudulent. It also observed:
While there ultimately may have been no financial harm to L.R. or
to the State because Attorney Nussberger's plan was never
completed, that does not mean that there was no harm caused by his
conduct. L.R. testified that the situation had caused her an immense
amount of stress, had adversely impacted her trust for attorneys, and
had led her to hope that she never needed to retain another attorney.
In addition to the harm.to the client, his conduct also certainly
harms the reputation of the profession generally. Id. at 506.
Nussberger was suspended for 60 days.
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4. Change from Contingent to Hourly Fee
New York County Lawyers' Association
Committee on Professional Ethics
Opinion 736 (9-21-06)
This New York ethics committee considered whether a retainer
agreement could permit a lawyer working on a contingent fee to convert
his or her compensation into an hourly rate arrangement if the client
refuses a reasonable settlement offer. The committee said that it could
not. It was of the view that giving such significant financial leverage to
the lawyer in the discussion of settlement options would impermissibly
interfere with the client's right to make settlement decisions.
C. No-Contact Rule & In-House Counsel
The no-contact rule is the one that generally prohibits lawyers from
communicating about the subject matter of the representation with
persons represented by counsel, unless that counsel consents.
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Formal Opinion 06-443 (August 5, 2006)
The ABA ethics committee said, in this opinion, that a lawyer who
represents a client in a matter involving an organization generally may
contact that organization's in-house counsel without seeking permission
from the organization's outside lawyer. The committee reasoned that the
protections provided by Rule 4.2, the no-contact rule, are not needed
when the person contacted is a lawyer.
Rule 4.2 prohibits a lawyer from communicating with a represented
person about the subject matter of the representation unless the person's
lawyer consents or unless the contact is authorized by law or court order.
Its purpose is to prevent a skilled advocate from taking advantage of a
non-lawyer. It prevents overreaching, shields the attorney-client
relationship, and protects uncounseled disclosure of confidential
information. In the organizational context, the rule prohibits an opposing
lawyer from communicating with a constituent of an organization who
supervises or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer about the
matter, who has authority to bind the organization in the matter, or whose
acts or omissionas may be imputed to the organization for purposes of
liability.
But the coramittee thought that it was unlikely that in-house counsel
would inadvertently make harmful disclosures. And if in-house counsel
did not want to be contacted by an opposing lawyer, he or she could refer
the contacting attorney to the organization's outside lawyer.
However, the committee observed that, in some instances, the in-
house lawyer could come within the scope of the rule. One of those
instances could arise when the in-house lawyer was involved in giving
advice or makina decisions that gave rise to the issues in the dispute.
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D. Confidentiality and the Attorney-Client Privilege
The duty of confidentiality can arise in situations that might surprise
some lawyers. That duty is sometimes confused with the attorney-client
privilege, which is an evidentiary rule.
Massachusetts Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics
Opinion 07-01 (5/27/07)
The Massachusetts Ethics Committee considered some issues
related to a lawyer's receipt of an unsolicited email communication from
a prospective client through a link on a law firm's website. In the
scenario considered in the opinion, the law firm's website included
biographical information for each lawyer and also a link that permitted a
viewer to send an email message to the lawyer. The website contained no
disclaimer regarding the confidentiality of any information sent to the
lawyer.
The committee analyzed a situation in which ABC Corp. used the
email link on the firm's website to inform one of the lawyers that it
wanted to retain the lawyer to bring a claim against XYZ Corp. and to
provide information about the claim. However, the firm was already
representing XYZ in unrelated matters, so the lawyer declined to take on
the new representation.
The committee said that, in some instances, a duty of confidentiality
could arise even if no attorney-client relationship were formed. Under
the facts, the committee thought that a prospective client who visited the
website might reasonably conclude that the firm had implicitly agreed to
consider whether to form an attorney-client relationship.
It also noted that the firm could have avoided this risk by
conditioning use of the email link through appropriate disclaimers. In
particular, it noted that the firm could have required a prospective client
to review and "click" his or her assent to the terms of use before using
the link.
The committee also concluded that the firm's receipt of confidential
information could limit the firm's ability to represent XYZ Corp. If the
email message included information that was relevant to ABC's claim
against XYZ, the committee thought that the obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of that information would materially limit the firm's
ability to represent XYZ. The result, according to the committee, would
be disqualification.
The committee noted that Model Rule 1.18, which was not adopted
in Massachusetts,5 provides for a more lenient treatment of the potential
conflict. Under that rule, a lawyer who receives confidential information
from a prospective client is prevented from representing an adverse party
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only if the information could be significantly harmful to the prospective
client in the matter. Even where there would be such harm,
representation could still be permissible, under Rule 1.18, if the lawyer
were to be time.y screened.
Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on Legal Ethics
Opinion 1832 (5/10/07)
The Virgir ia ethics committee considered whether a lawyer owes a
duty of confidentiality to a prospective client who speaks with the
lawyer's secretary.
In the question presented to the committee, a woman called the
lawyer's office for a consultation in a matter concerning her former
husband. She spoke with the lawyer's secretary. The secretary scheduled
an appointment to meet with the lawyer. Later the woman called back
and told the secretary that the lawyer had previously represented the
sister of her ex-husband. The secretary so informed the lawyer. Before
this second call, however, the ex-husband had made an appointment to
meet with the lawyer. And the lawyer told the secretary that he would not
represent the woman; instead, he would represent the ex-husband.
The woman objected to the representation. She said that she had
told the secreta:y "all the facts" about her case. However, the secretary
and the lawyer contend that they did not learn any confidences from the
woman. The issue was whether it was permissible for the lawyer to
continue to represent the ex-husband against the ex-wife.
The ethics committee concluded that, even though the lawyer had
not spoken witb the ex-wife, and had not agreed to represent her, he
owed her a duty of confidentiality. The committee said that a person who
consults with a .awyer may reasonably expect that the lawyer will protect
confidential infbrmation. Individuals who seek legal assistance must be
comfortable that information they reveal to a lawyer will not be used
against them.
The committee said that the duty of confidentiality is also triggered
when information is given to support staff. It noted that, under Rule 5.3,
a lawyer is obligated to instruct and to supervise nonlawyer assistants
about the ethical aspects of their work, including the aspect of preserving
the confidentiality of client information.
In this instance, the committee said that the lawyer could continue
to represent the ex-husband, provided that the secretary was screened
from involvement in the representation. If the screen were to be
breached, and the lawyer were to learn confidential information that the
ex-wife had provided to the secretary, the lawyer might have to withdraw
from the represcntation.
It should b.- noted that Rule 1.18 includes some provisions relating
to duties to prospective clients.
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State v. Branham
952 So. 2d 618 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007)
Attorney Kelly was a friend to Michael Branham and his wife, who
were having marital difficulties. He made it clear that he would not
represent either of them in divorce proceedings, but he agreed to act as a
go-between to help them with their difficulties. He was also representing
Michael in a negligence case. On one occasion, he went to Michael's
house on a social visit. Michael asked.Kelly if he was his attorney. Kelly
said, "Sure." Michael then said that he was going to kill his wife. He said
this several times during their conversation. Kelly told Michael, "You're
crazy. I don't even want to hear it. Don't talk like that."
About a week later, Michael's wife was killed. Thereafter, Kelly
was subpoenaed to disclose relevant information. He raised the attorney-
client privilege, but a judge ordered him to respond, and he did. In the
criminal proceedings against Michael, the.state sought a ruling that the
conversation between Kelly and Michael was not subject to the attorney-
client privilege. The trial court ruled that the conversation was covered
by the attorney-client privilege. However, the court of appeals said that it
was not.
By Florida statute, the privilege applies to communications only if
they are made in the rendition of legal services to the client.6 The court
concluded that this was not the case here. Michael had not asked Kelly
for legal advice and Kelly did not give any. It was not enough that Kelly
had told Michael that he was his lawyer. The privilege, said the court, "is
not established by incantation. Nor does it come into existence simply
because a party believes that it exists." 952 So. 2d at 621. In this
instance, the conversation was, according to the court, totally unrelated
to the lawyer-client relationship between Kelly and Michael. As a result,
the information from the conversation was admissible.
A concurring judge observed that even if Michael had asked Kelly
for advice with respect to the murder, the privilege would not have
applied, on account of the crime-fraud exception.
E. Fraud and Other Wickedness
Rule 8.4 prohibits lawyers from engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
6 By way of comparison, article 506(B) of the Louisiana Code of Evidence provides,
in part:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another person from
disclosing, a confidential communication, whether oral, written, or otherwise, made
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the
client....
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In re Scanio
919 A.2d 1137 (D.C. Ct. App. 2007)
Lawyer Scanio was involved in a traffic accident in September of
2000. He sought medical treatment, and he missed the next day of work
at his law firm. A claims adjuster for the other driver's insurance
company coniacted Scanio about the accident. He said that he was a
partner at his law firm. He sent the adjuster a letter claiming economic
loss of $16,697 as of December 29, 2000. He calculated this by
multiplying his hourly billing rate of $295 per hour by the time lost
attributable to his injuries. Later, he told the adjuster that his hourly rate
had increased to $325 per hour and that his economic loss amounted to
$23,034 though February 8, 2001.
The adjuster called Scanio's law firm and learned that he was a non-
equity partner - a salaried employee - who was paid about $122 per
hour, and that he had not been docked for sick leave or any other time.
Thereafter, the law firm looked at the correspondence between the
adjuster and Scanio. It told Scanio that it considered his statements
misleading because, as a salaried employee, he was not entitled to a
portion of the firm's billings. The firm told him that he was being
terminated. It also sent copies of the correspondence to bar counsel.
Scanio was charged with a violation of Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
The disciplinary case eventually came before the court of appeals. It
concluded that Scanio had violated Rule 8.4(c). Scanio contended that he
had been engaged in "aggressive conduct between business adversaries,"
and he claimed that he had, in fact, provided information to the adjuster
that showed that he was not being compensated at $295 or $325 per hour.
The court rejected this contention, and noted:
As the Board explained, "[The nature of Respondent's
misstaternents and material omissions is evidence, by itself, of his
intent to ieceive [the adjuster] into believing that he had actually
lost incone at a rate governed by his billing rate." Moreover, the
Board's conclusion that the April 3 'letter to the firm contained "a
series of blatant lies" speaks for itself. 919 A.2d at 1143.
Scanio was suspended for 30 days.
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Professional
Responsibility
Formal Opinion 07-446 (5-5-07)
In some instances, lawyers may be tempted to "ghostwrite"
pleadings for pro se litigants. In a 1978 informal opinion, the ABA
Ethics Committee indicated that a lawyer must make the court aware of
the fact that a ghostwritten document that was submitted to the court was
really written by a lawyer. Departing from this view, the ABA Ethics
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Committee has now concluded that lawyers who ghostwrite pleadings
need not inform the court or an opponent of what they have done. In so
opining, the committee rejected the view that such ghostwriting is
inherently misleading and unfairly exploits the alleged tendency of
courts to be soft on pro se litigants.
The committee did not think that ghostwritten documents receive
special treatment by the court. If the ghostwriting lawyer provided
effective help to the litigant, the committee thought that would be evident
to the court. On the other hand, if the lawyer did not provide effective
help, his or her work would give the litigant no advantage. Moreover, the
committee was of the view that there was no inherent dishonesty
involved in ghostwriting pleadings. "The lawyer is making no statement
at all to the forum regarding the nature of scope of the representation."
The committee did indicate, however, that disclosure of the lawyer's
role would be necessary if the failure to reveal that role would amount to
assistance in fraudulent or dishonest conduct on the part of the litigant.
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Zins
875 N.E.2d 941 (Ohio 2007) (per curiam)
By the summer of 2005, attorney Zins found that he could not meet
his child-support obligations or pay his bills. He decided to use his
position at a Citibank branch to steal money. He opened a bank account
in one customer's name and applied for a credit card using that
customer's identity. He also accessed bank records and changed another
customer's address to a vacant apartment near his home and ordered
checks for delivery there. By drafting checks from that customer's
account and using a debit card to access the first customer's account,
Zins stole $1,236. He tried to use the vacant apartment and a post office
box as addresses at which he hoped to obtain credit cards from two other
customers, but he was caught before he could do so.
Zins was charged with identify fraud. He pleaded guilty, was
required to perform community service, and reported his conviction to
the bar association.
The Ohio disciplinary board charged Zins with conduct involving
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. The Ohio Supreme Court observed
that a lawyer who commits crimes of theft "violates the duty to maintain
personal honesty and integrity, which is one of the most basic
professional obligations owed by lawyers to the public." 875 N.E.2d at
943. The court noted that it had previously disbarred lawyers for theft
offenses. Here, however, there were several mitigating factors, including
full restitution, cooperation with disciplinary authorities, and genuine
remorse. Zins was suspended for two years.
F. Legal Thuggery
There are some purposes for which lawsuits should not be used.
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Seltzer v. Morton
154 P.3d 561 (Mont. 2007)
Morton paid an art gallery $38,000 for a painting bearing the
signature of western artist C.M. Russell. Some years later, it was
estimated to be worth $650,000. Morton decided to put it up for auction.
The auction house declined to sell the painting, however, because it
suspected that the painting was a forgery, and was actually the work of a
lesser artist, 0. C. Seltzer. It hired art expert W. Steve Seltzer, who is 0.
C.'s Seltzer's grandson, to examine the piece. Seltzer concluded that the
painting had bzen done by his grandfather. A second art expert reached
the same conclusion.
On Morton's behalf, the Gibson Dunn & Crutcher law firm tried to
get Seltzer and the other expert to disavow their conclusions. Among
other things, :he firm wanted the experts to say that they had not
thoroughly examined the painting. It threatened to sue them unless they
did so. When the experts did not cooperate, the firm sued them for
defamation, negligence, and interference with business dealings. The suit
was later dismissed when Morton could not find an expert who would
certify the authenticity of the painting. Seltzer, on the other hand,
produced nine expert affidavits in support of his analysis.
Seltzer sued Morton and Gibson Dunn for malicious prosecution
and abuse of process. He introduced evidence that while the firm was
suing him it was also seeking compensation from the art gallery for
selling Morton a fake. A jury awarded Seltzer $1.1 million in
compensatory damages and $20 million in punitives. The punitive award
was reduced to $9.9 million by the judge.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court said that it agreed
with Gibson Dinn's position that the mere filing of an unfounded lawsuit
does not establish an abuse of process. However, the court was of the
view that Seltzer had shown that the law firm had not used the lawsuit as
a legitimate means to resolve a dispute but had instead used it as an
instrument of 'coercion to force Seltzer to perform a collateral act -
renouncing hi:; opinion - that it could not legally require. It also
considered the punitive damages to be appropriate. Summarizing its
views on the conduct of the law firm, the court said:
In short, GDC's use of the judicial system amounts to legal
thuggery. This behavior is truly repugnant to Montana's
foundational notions of justice and is therefore highly reprehensible.
Thus, in accordance with Montana's legitimate interest in
punishment and deterrence, we conclude that a particularly severe
sanction c mports with due process. 154 P.3d at 609.
G. Collaborative Law
Never heard of "collaborative law"? It's starting to get some
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attention from ethics committees.
American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility
Formal Opinion 07-447 (8-9-07)
In this opinion, the ABA Ethics Committee considered the propriety
of engaging in "collaborative law practice." This involves a type of
alternative dispute resolution, in which lawyers and their clients agree to
work together cooperatively in order to reach a settlement. They enter
into a contract, typically called a "four-way" agreement, in which they
agree to negotiate toward a settlement without court intervention, and in
which they agree to share information to achieve such a settlement. The
four-way agreement includes a provision that if the effort fails, the
lawyers will withdraw from the representation and will not be involved
in litigation related to the dispute.
Is this sort of thing ethical? The ABA committee thought so. It
noted that lawyers are free to limit the scope of their representation under
Rule 1.2, if the limitation is reasonable and if the client gives informed
consent. It rejected the view of a Colorado ethics committee that
collaborative law practice involves a nonwaivable conflict under Rule
1.7. It agreed that a lawyer's agreement to withdraw from representation
if a settlement is not achieved does create "responsibility to a third
party," under Rule 1.7, but it opined that this responsibility does not
create a conflict of interest. In that connection, the ABA committee said
that a lawyer's responsibility to a third person amounts to a conflict of
interest if there is a significant risk that the responsiblity will materially
limit the lawyer's representation of the client. But the committee thought
that, in collaborative law practice, the agreement to withdraw does not
impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client. That agreement,
thought the committee, is consistent with the client's limited goals for the
representation.
The ABA committee did say that the client's informed consent to
collaborative law practice requires the lawyer to provide adequate
information about the contractual terms and rules governing the process,
the advantages and disadvantages of the process, and the availability of
alternatives to the process. The lawyer must make sure that the client
understands that the lawyer will have to withdraw if a settlement is not
achieved and that, in that case, the client will have to retain another
lawyer.
Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee
Opinion 115 (2/24/07)
As indicated above, the Colorado ethics committee took a different
view. The ethics committee thought that the practice of collaborative law
violates Colorado Rule 1.7(b), which forbids a lawyer from representing
a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's
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responsibilities to a third person, unless the lawyer reasonably believes
that the representation will not be adversely affected and the client
consents after consultation. The problem is that the disqualification
agreement that is part of a collaborative law arrangement gives the
lawyer "responsibilities" to a third person - in this case the opponent.
And the committee did not think that the problem could be resolved with
consent, because if the collaborative process is unsuccessful, the
lawyer's obligation to the opponent will take priority over the lawyer's
obligation to consider litigation.
The committee noted that some other ethics committees had
approved collaborative law arrangements, but it said that those
committees had not focused on Rule 1.7.
It contrasted collaborative law with "cooperative law." The
committee said that they are similar, but that cooperative law does not
require a lawyc:r to enter into a disqualification agreement with an
opposing party. A cooperative law arrangement would be permissible
even if the lawyer entered into an agreement with his or her own client to
limit the representation to the cooperative process. The committee
thought that such an agreement would represent an application of Rule
1.2's provision on limiting the scope of representation, as opposed to an
agreement with Ihe opposing party to terminate the representation.
H. Metadata
There have been more developments involving metadata.
District of Columbia Legal Ethics Committee
Opinion 341 (9/07)
Weighing in on the metadata problem, the District of Columbia
Ethics Committee has taken the view that a lawyer is forbidden to review
metadata in an .electronic document received from an adversary only
when the lawyei has actual knowledge that it was inadvertently sent. In
any other circumstances, a receiving lawyer is free to use the metadata.
. But the committee had a somewhat unusual view of "actual
knowledge." It said that this exists not only when a lawyer is told of the
mistake before receiving the document, and not only when the receiving
lawyer immediately notices upon review of the metadata that it was
obviously accidc ntally sent, but also when the lawyer uses a system to
mine all incoming electronic documents with the hope of finding a
confidence or a secret. The duty to avoid reviewing the metadata in these
circumstances, the committee thought, arises out of the lawyer's duty of
honesty.
The committee also observed that lawyers who send electronic
documents must take care to avoid providing ones that inadvertently
contain accessible confidences or secrets. This obligation arises out of
the duty of confidentiality.
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Ethics committee opinions have reached different conclusions about
metadata. Some state that review of metadata is permissible. Others have
reached an opposite conclusion.
I. Duties of Departing Lawyer
Disputes sometimes arise over the pre-departure conduct of lawyers
who move to new law firms.
Kopka, Landau & Pinkus v. Hansen
874 N.E.2d 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
Larry Hansen was an associate at the Kopka law firm until he left to
become a partner at the Skiles firm. The same day he resigned from the
Kopka firm, three of the support staff and four other associates at that
firm also resigned. Within a month, another Kopka associate also
resigned. All of these associates and the departing support staff also
joined the Skiles firm.
The Kopka firm sued Hansen, claiming that he breached his
fiduciary duty to the law firm, broke his contact with it, tortiously
interfered with the firm's business opportunities, and wrongfully
interfered with the business relationships between the firm and its
employees. Kopka also filed some claims against the Skiles firm and one
of its partners. In its complaint, the Kopka firm claimed that Hansen had
been the managing partner of its Indianapolis office, but it later conceded
that Hansen had been as associate. The defendants counterclaimed for
malicious prosecution.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. With
respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court of appeals stated:
"although an employee may not actively and directly compete with his
current employer, he may prepare to do so without breaching his duty of
loyalty." 874 N.E.2d at 1071. The court thought that it did not violate
this standard for Hansen to have 1) discussed with a paralegal at the
Kopka firm a specific dollar figure that it might take for her to switch to
the new law firm; and 2) asked an associate at the Kopka firm whether he
wanted to go with him to the new law firm. It said:
He was certainly preparing to compete by questioning KLP
employees about their desire, if any, to leave KLP and work for
SHCD in the future. He was gathering information about [the
paralegal's] salary requirement and [the associate's] willingness to
quit his job. He expressed a desire to find positions for all of the
KLP employees at SHCD. There is no evidence, however, that
Hansen made formal offers of employment with SHCD to KLP
employees or that he took actions that constituted anything more
than mere preparation to compete with KLP. Consequently, we find
that the trial court properly entered summary judgment in Hansen's
favor on this count of KLP's complaint. Id. at 1071-72.
- 234 -
46
Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 55 [2008], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol55/iss1/10
Neither did i:he court find a basis to overturn an award of $22,000 in
attorneys' fees against the Kopka firm for engaging in frivolous litigation
and malicious prosecution. It noted, in this connection, that the Kopka
firm had filed its lawsuit in a venue that was not preferred, had lost all of
its claims on summary judgment, had incorrectly claimed that Hansen
had been a Kopka partner, and had not produced facts in support of its
claims.
J. Out of State Practice
There is more flexibility than there used to be regarding multi-state
practice. But that does not mean that there are no limits.
Mitchell v. Progressive Insurance Co.
965 So. 2d 679 (Miss. 2007)
On November 27, 2002, Mississippi resident Carl Mitchell was
involved in an automobile accident with Louisiana resident Patrick
Benfatti, in New Orleans. On January 16, 2003, Mitchell's attorney, Karl
Wiedemann, faxed a letter to Progressive Gulf Insurance Company
stating that Ben;'atti was not insured at the time of the accident and
asserting an unin:;ured motorist claim against Progressive.
In December of 2005, Mitchell attempted to file a complaint against
Progressive in Mississippi. The complaint was signed by Wiedemann, a
Louisiana attorney, and included his office address in New Orleans and
his Louisiana ba- number. Wiedemann was not licensed in Mississippi.
That complaint was rejected by the Mississippi court clerk. In February
of 2006, Mitchell filed a separate complaint against Progressive in
Mississippi, this t:ime signed by a Mississippi attorney.
Progressive filed a "Motion to Dismiss, in the alternative, Motion
for Summary Judgment." Following a hearing, the court entered a
judgment finding that the December 2005 complaint was not legally filed
and the Februaiy 2006 complaint was filed beyond the statute of
limitations and was therefore time barred. Mitchell appealed. The case
eventually came before the Mississippi Supreme Court, which affirmed.
On the issue of the validity of the December 2005 complaint, the
court said:
This Court finds that the December 5, 2005, complaint was properly
refused by the circuit clerk and stricken from the record. Mitchell
has presented no evidence that Wiedemann was licensed in
Mississippi or had complied with any rule allowing a pro hac vice
appearance. 965 So.2d at 684.
The court also found that Wiedemann's conduct, in attempting to
file the December 5, 2005, complaint without being admitted pro hac
vice, "may merit discipline by the Mississippi and/or Louisiana State
Bar." Id. at 685. It remanded with instructions to notify the Louisiana
State Bar of Wiedemann's conduct, which it characterized as
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unauthorized practice of law.
K. Offensive Conduct
Boorish conduct is inconsistent with concepts of professionalism.
But it can also lead to lawyer discipline. In some cases, though, the First
Amendment can offer protection to the boorish lawyer.
Fieger v. Michigan Supreme Court
2007 WL 2571975 (E.D. Mich. 2007)
Michigan attorney Geoffrey Fieger was reprimanded for some
statements he made about appellate court judges on a radio show. He was
unhappy with the judges because they had overturned a multimillion
dollar verdict for his client. He compared them to Nazis and jackasses, he
said that they should be sodomized, and invited them to "kiss [his] ass."
Fieger was reprimanded based on Michigan ethics rules that
prohibited lawyers from engaging in "undignified or discourteous
conduct" toward tribunals and that required lawyers to treat everyone in
the legal process with "dignity and respect."
The federal district court concluded that those rules violate the
constitutional rights to free speech and due process, because they are
over broad and vague. The court acknowledged that it was appropriate to
restrict freedom of speech by attorneys in some instances, particularly in
the courtroom. But it said that:
the further an attorney's speech is from the judicial process or the
closer it is to the end of a pending case, the less weight that should
be given to a State's interests in regulating this specialized
profession.
In this instance, the court was concerned that, in disciplining Fieger,
the Michigan Supreme Court had not sufficiently limited the scope of the
words "discourteous" and "undignified." It said:
By leaving the terms undefined, the courtesy provisions regulate
almost any conceivable arena of attorney expression and critical
speech, both protected and unprotected, including speech that
should permit "extensive public scrutiny and criticism." ... As
interpreted, the rules reach any criticism of the tribunal whether it is
warranted or unwarranted, political or apolitical, truthful or false,
vulgar or artful. There are no exceptions for truth, for political
speech, or for speech that does not create a "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" to a pending case.
In addition, the majority failed to differentiate between discourteous
and undignified speech that may harm the fair administration of
justice and the same type of speech that merely harms the dignity of
the judiciary. In promoting the first interest, attorney speech is
subject to more limitations based on a less stringent standard,
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice." Whereas, when
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enforcing the rules to preserve judicial integrity, attorney speech
should be subject to restriction based on a higher standard.
The court concluded that the applicable regulations were over broad
and vague. And it granted declaratory relief in favor of Fieger.
State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of
Nebraska Supreme Court v. Beach
722 N.W.2d 30 (Neb. 2006) (per curiam)
Attorney Beach met a waitress at a truck stop and agreed to help her
with a felony probation revocation. Although the client was barred from
drinking alcohol by the terms of her probation, Beach took her to bars
and bought her drinks. He later said that he did this to "balance her
wacky head." Beach sent some letters to the county attorney relating to
the matter of his c'ient's probation.
Without any request from his client, Beach sent her a divorce
petition and asked her to sign it. He wrote to her:
Deep in your heart, you know that [your husband] is bad for you
and always has been. You also know that for you to have a good life
this sub human has to go . . . . He is scum and always will be.
Honey, you can have a future. Let's make it a good future. [The
judge assigned to the probation revocation case] will know you are
sincere if you dump your hubby. 772 N.W.2d at 22.
Without his client's consent, Beach sent the husband a letter telling
him that his client now realized "what a useless piece of shit you are,"
and suggested that he kill himself by jumping off a bridge. The waitress
later fired Beach.
When discipl nary proceedings were commenced against Beach, he
wrote a letter to the bar association, stating that the proceedings were the
result of a complaint by "a very dangerous woman attorney." He sent a
copy of the letter to the attorney with a handwritten notation stating:
"The practice was more enjoyable before feminazi bitches like you came
on the scene." Id. at 34.
He also said, in a separate letter to disciplinary authorities, that
"[y]our rules suck in situations like this." And he also said, "I have
several pissed off friends who are meaner that junk-yard dogs and have
good memories."
According to the published opinion in the case, a disciplinary
referee:
found that respondent's client, J.N., "was a drug addicted,
psychologically impaired woman in need of legal and personal
help." She retained respondent to represent her with respect to a
probation revocation case. Before she finally discharged him as her
lawyer, respondent accompanied her to bars and purchased
alcoholic beverages for her, in violation of the terms of her
-237-
49
Smith: Legal Ethics, Pain, and Suffering
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2008
probation; urged her estranged husband to commit suicide; and
directed her to sign a divorce petition which he had drafted without
being requested to do so. When disciplinary charges were filed
against him, respondent directed his verbal fury at the Counsel for
Discipline, court-appointed referees, the attorney representing J.N.,
the bar association, and this court. Some of his letters disclosed
confidential information about J.N. to persons having no association
with these proceedings. Hostile, threatening, and disruptive conduct
reflects on an attorney's honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, and
reliability and adversely reflects on one's fitness to practice law. Id.
at 35.
The Nebraska Supreme Court also observed that "[c]umulative acts
of attorney misconduct are distinguishable from isolated incidents and
are therefore deserving of more serious sanctions." Id. Beach was
disbarred.
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